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Case No. 20080768-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Michael Dan Kerr,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for aggravated assault, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004), and possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(b) (West 2004); from sentences enhanced on both counts
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8(2) (West 2004); and from an additional
sentence for recidivism imposed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8(4) (West
2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West
Supp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. The trial court applied dangerous weapon sentencing enhancements to
Defendant's sentences for aggravated assault and possession of a dangerous
weapon by a restricted person. Did the legislature intend that the enhancements

apply to these offenses and do the enhancements therefore comport with double
jeopardy provisions?
Standard of review. Whether the legislature intended that dangerous weapon
enhancements apply to offenses involving dangerous weapons is a question of
statutory interpretation, reviewed for correctness. See State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, f 6,
122 P.3d 615; see also State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, %f 40-41, 153 P.3d 804.
Whether the enhanced sentences comport with double jeopardy is a legal question,
also reviewed for correctness. See State v. Northcutt, 2006 UT App 269, f 7,139 P.3d
1066; see also Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, % 39.
2. Did the trial court plainly err in not sua sponte ruling that the additional
five-to-ten year mandatory consecutive sentence for recidivism constituted cruel
and unusual punishment under the Utah constitution?
To establish plain error, a defendant must show that "(i) [a]n error exists;
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful." State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511,112,153 P.3d 804.
3. Was counsel ineffective for not arguing that the additional five-to-ten-year
mandatory consecutive sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under
the United States and Utah constitutions?
"When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 'is raised for the first time on
appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it presents a question of law/" Alfatlawi,
2

2006 UT App 511,111 (quoting State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, If 26,61 P.3d 291
(additional citation and quotation marks omitted)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
included in the Addendum :
U.S. Const, amend V (double jeopardy);
U.S. Const, amend. VIII (cruel and unusual punishment);
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 (double jeopardy);
Utah Const, art. I, § 9 (cruel and unusual punishment; unnecessary rigor);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004) (aggravated assault);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (West 2004) (possession of a dangerous weapon
by a restricted person);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8 (West 2004) (enhancement for use of dangerous
weapon).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Defendant with aggravated assault, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004), and possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person ("possession by a restricted person"), a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(b) (West 2004).
See R7-8 (amended information). The State also charged Defendant with conduct
subjecting him to a dangerous weapon enhancement, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-203.8 (West 2004). See id. The charges were based on a June 16,2006 incident.
See R9.
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and a bench trial was held. R12729. The trial court found Defendant guilty of aggravated assault and found that a
3

"dangerous weapon was used in the commission of the aggravated assault." R128;
Rl94:110-11. The court further found Defendant guilty of possession by a restricted
person and found that the dangerous weapon penalty enhancement was applicable.
R128; R194:112. Finally, the court found that Defendant had been convicted of a
prior felony for coercion with the use of a dangerous weapon in Clark County,
Nevada, on September 2,1998. See R194:110-lll.
The court sentenced Defendant to enhanced concurrent prison terms of one to
ten years on his convictions for aggravated assault and possession by a restricted
person. R153. The Court also imposed an additional consecutive prison term of five
to ten years based on Defendant's having used a dangerous weapon in the offenses
in this case after having been previously convicted and sentenced for the 1998
Nevada felony in which he used a dangerous weapon. See id.
Defendant timely appealed. R156.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The offense

On June 16, 2006, a fight broke out between Defendant and another man in
the men's restroom of the Outlaw Saloon in Weber County. R194:7-9. Saloon
security personnel Brandon Hartley and Brent McKissick broke up the fight and
took the two men to separate locations outside the establishment. R194:12-13.
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McKissick stayed with Defendant, whose face was purple and swollen,
while they waited for the paramedics. R194:27. When Defendant tried to stand
up, McKissick asked him to sit on the ground, relax, and wait until the
paramedics arrived. Id. When sheriffs deputies began pulling into the parking
lot, Defendant stood up and began walking away. R194:29. McKissick walked
toward Defendant, again asking him to sit down. Id.
As McKissick drew close, Defendant" swung up with his left hand and hit
[McKissick] in the cheek/' stabbing him with a knife. R194:29-36. "Within
seconds [McKissick's] mouth filled with blood ... and [he] observed [a] knife in
[Defendant's] hand." R194:30. Defendant and McKissick wrestled with one
another until McKissick got control of the situation. Rl94:31.
Hartley and a deputy sheriff came running. Id. The deputy sheriff pried
the knife from Defendant's hand and handcuffed him. R194:32.
McKissick did not see the knife before Defendant stabbed him in the face.
R194:33. He did not make any aggressive movements toward Defendant, did not
threaten him, and did not brandish or even carry a weapon. Id.
The knife wound "went all the way through to the inside of the cheek
about 2 inches/' R194:35. McKissick also suffered a cut on his left arm, a small
gash on his left side, and a small cut on his left thumb. Id.

5

Medical personnel later treated Defendant for the injuries he had suffered
in the initial restroom fight. R194:81. They then transported Defendant to the
hospital for an assessment, and a deputy sheriff followed them. R194:68~69. The
deputy heard Defendant tell the medical staff at the hospital that he '"got his ass
kicked/ and that the security guard ... was standing over him laughing so he
stabbed him. He told the staff that he did not intend to stab him in the face, that
he was trying to stab him in the hand to scare him." R194:72.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The trial court properly imposed all sentence enhancements in this case.
Where the legislature intends to provide for cumulative penalties, those penalties do
not violate double jeopardy protections. This Court has already held that the
legislature intended to provide for cumulative penalties when it enacted the statute
governing enhancements for using dangerous weapons. Thus, the trial court did
not violate double jeopardy provisions when it enhanced Defendant's sentences for
aggravated assault and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person or
when it imposed a consecutive cumulative sentence because Defendant committed
these offenses after having been convicted and sentenced for an earlier felony
involving the use of a dangerous weapon.
2. Defendant has not shown that the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte
holding that the additional consecutive five-to-ten-year prison term constituted
6

cruel and unusual punishment under the Utah constitution. Defendant has not
shown that there was any settled appellate law that would have made any error
obvious.
3. Defendant has not shown that his trial counsel was ineffective for not
claiming that the additional consecutive five-to-ten-year prison term constituted
cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and Utah constitutions. He
has not shown why, on the basis of the law in effect at the time of trial, counsel
should have made that claim.

7

ARGUMENT
I.
THE LEGISLATURE AUTHORIZED AND THE TRIAL COURT
PROPERLY IMPOSED ENHANCED SENTENCES, WHERE
DEFENDANT USED A WEAPON IN COMMITTING BOTH
OFFENSES AND WHERE THE OFFENSES FOLLOWED
ANOTHER FELONY CONVICTION INVOLVING USE OF A
DANGEROUS WEAPON; NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY
VIOLATION OCCURRED
Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it imposed dangerous
weapon sentence enhancements to his sentences for aggravated assault and
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. According to Defendant,
"[t]here is no way to obtain convictions of Aggravated Assault and Possession of a
Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person without the possession of a weapon/'
Br. Appellant at 11. Thus, Defendant asserts, "the dangerous weapon penalty
enhancements] must merge into the greater offenses of aggravated assault and
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person/' Id. Defendant asserts
that failing to merge the enhancements violated his double jeopardy rights. Id, at 9.
Alternatively, Defendant argues, the weapons enhancement provisions
should not even apply to the crime of possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person, because that crime requires only "possession" of a dangerous
weapon and the enhancement statute requires "use" of a dangerous weapon. Id. at

8

18. He also relies on this alternate argument to support his claim that imposing the
enhancements violated his double jeopardy rights. Id. at 19.
Neither of Defendant's claims has merit.
Relevant law. Aggravated assault. Defendant was charged with aggravated
assault based on his use of a dangerous weapon, namely, a knife. See R7. A person
commits aggravated assault if, in committing an assault, he uses a dangerous
weapon. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b).
Possession by a restricted person. A person is a "Category I restricted person" if
he "has been convicted of any violent felony" as defined by statute. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-503(l)(a)(i). "A Category I restricted person who intentionally or
knowingly ... purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under his custody or
control... any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third degree
felony." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2). Thus, while this offense is commonly
called "possession by a restricted person," a restricted person violates the statute not
only if he possesses a dangerous weapon, but also if he purchases, transfers, uses, or
has a dangerous weapon under his custody or control.
Dangerous weapon enhancement. The dangerous weapon enhancement statute,
found at Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8 (West 2004), provides for two kinds of
enhancements. Subsection 2 provides that "[i]f the trier of fact finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or
9

furtherance of a felony, the court... shall increase by one year the minimum term of
the sentence" and "may increase by five years the maximum sentence." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203.8(2) (emphasis added).
Subsection 4 provides that "[if] the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable
doubt that a person has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony in
which a dangerous weapon was used" and "that person is subsequently convicted
of another felony in which a dangerous weapon was used ... the court shall, in
addition to any other sentence imposed including those in Subsection (2), impose an
indeterminate prison term to be not less than five nor more than ten years to run
consecutively and not concurrently." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8(4) (emphasis
added).
Double jeopardy and merger. The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that no person "shall... be subject for the same offence to be

10

twice put in jeopardy of life or limb/' U.S. Const, amend. V.1 "[T]he double
jeopardy guarantee contained in these provisions protects a defendant from (1) a
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same
offense." State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, \ 51,192 P.3d 867 (quoting State v. Rudolph, 970
P.2d 1221,1230 (Utah 1998)). The protection Defendant invokes here is that against
"multiple punishments for the same offense/' Id.; see also Br. Appellant at 12.
"Merger is a judicially-crafted doctrine available to protect criminal
defendants from being twice punished for committing a single act that may violate
more than one criminal statute/ 7 State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,117,55 P.3d 1131.
Thus, "[cjourts apply the merger doctrine as one means of alleviating the concern of
double jeopardy that a defendant should not be punished twice for the same crime/ 7
State v. Lopez, 2004 UT App 410, \ 8,103 P.3d 153.
1

Article I, section 12 of the Utah constitution also provides that no person
" s h a l l . . . be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense/7 Utah Const, art. I, § 12.
Defendant briefly references the double jeopardy provision of the Utah constitution.
Br. Appellant at 14. But if he is intending to rely on the state constitutional
provision, he has not adequately briefed that claim. He has not offered any "unique
state constitutional analysis77 in his brief to this Court, instead only offering "cursory
references to the state constitution within arguments otherwise dedicated to a
federal constitutional claim.77 State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ^ 18-19,164 P.3d 397.
Therefore, his state constitutional claim is not properly before this Court.

11

The merger doctrine is now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (West
2004). See State v. Perez-Avila, 2006 UT App 71,110,131 P.3d 864; State v. Lee, 2006
UT 5, \ 32,128 P.3d 1179. Section 76-1-402 provides that, "[a] defendant... may not
be convicted of both the offense charged and [an] included offense/' Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-402(3). Under this section, "an offense qualifies as a lesser included
offense when the offense 'is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged/ " Perez-Avila, 2006 UT
App 71, 1 10 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)(a)). In other words, '"[i]f the
greater offense "cannot be committed without necessarily having committed the
lesser, then the lesser offense merges into the greater crime. "'" State v. Smith, 2003
UT App 179,112, 72 P.3d 692 (quoting State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50,121,42 P.3d
1248).2
The merger doctrine does not apply, however, "where the legislature
intended a statute to be an enhancement statute." State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, f 9,122
P.3d 615. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "With respect to
cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no

2

A second form of merger, not relevant here, is set forth in State v. Finlayson,
2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243.

12

more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than
the legislature intended." Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983). "Where [the
legislature] intended ...to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does
not violate the Constitution." Id. at 368 (citations and internal quotations omitted)
(emphasis in Hunter).
Finally, in State v. Alfatlawi, this Court considered whether the legislature
intended to provide for multiple punishments when it enacted Utah's dangerous
weapons enhancement statute. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, \ 37. This Court held
that the plain and unambiguous language of section 76-3-203.8 and its mandatory
imposition of increased sentences showed that the legislature intended the statute to
impose cumulative punishments.

Id. at W 40-41 (noting that both the plain

language of the statute and its legislative history demonstrated "a legislative intent
to authorize cumulative punishment for a single act/7 i.e., to impose an
enhancement). Id. at f 41. "As a result/' the Court concluded, "the dangerous
weapon enhancement statute complies with the requirements of Hunter and does
not violate the Fifth Amendment/ 7 Id. a ^f 40. The Court "likewise determine[d]
that [a] dangerous weapon enhancement does not violate the Utah Constitution's
prohibition against double jeopardy.77 Id. at ^ 42 (citing Utah Const, art. I, § 12).
Proceedings below. The trial court, acting as trier of fact in a bench trial,
found Defendant guilty of aggravated assault based on his use of a dangerous
13

weapon during the commission of an assault. R194:104. The court also found
Defendant guilty of possession by a restricted person based on his use of a
dangerous weapon during the assault. R194:112. And the court found that
Defendant had a prior conviction for a violent felony — his 1998 Nevada conviction
for coercion with a dangerous weapon. R194:lll.
Based on these findings, the trial court ordered that Defendant's sentences for
aggravated assault and possession of a dangerous weapon be enhanced under
subsection (2) of the dangerous weapons enhancement statute. R195:4. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8(2) (providing that "[i]f the trier of fact finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or
furtherance of a felony, the court... shall increase by one year the minimum term of
the sentence" and "may increase by five years the maximum sentence"). Thus,
instead of imposing sentences of zero to five years, the trial court imposed sentences
of one to ten years on those convictions. R195:4.
The court then ordered that Defendant also serve a consecutive five-to-tenyear prison term for recidivism under subsection (4) of the dangerous weapons
enhancement statute. Id. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8(4) (providing that "[if]
the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a person has been sentenced to
a term of imprisonment for a felony in which a dangerous weapon was used ... and
that person is subsequently convicted of another felony in which a dangerous
14

weapon was used ... the court shall, in addition to any other sentence imposed
including those in Subsection (2), impose an indeterminate prison term to be not less
than five nor more than ten years to run consecutively"). The court did not specify
whether this mandatory sentence was based on Defendant's aggravated assault
charge, his possession-by-a-restricted-person charge, or both. See id.
A. Because the legislature intended that the dangerous weapon
statute provide for enhanced penalties, merger does not apply
and imposition of cumulative punishments does not violate
double jeopardy protections.
Defendant claims that "the dangerous weapon penalty enhancement must
merge into the greater offenses of aggravated assault and possession of a dangerous
weapon by a restricted person." Br. Appellant at 11. According to Defendant,
merger is required because the only element necessary to support the enhancements
in this case was possession/use of a dangerous weapon and possession/use of a
dangerous weapon is already an element of the underlying aggravated assault and
possession-by-a-restricted-person offenses. See id.
Defendant's claim fails because, as the Utah Supreme Court has held, the
merger doctrine does not apply "where the legislature intended a statute to be an
enhancement statute." State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, t 9,122 P.3d 615. And, as this
Court has already held, both the plain language of the dangerous weapons
enhancement statute and its legislative history demonstrate "a legislative intent to
authorize cumulative punishment for a single act," i.e., to impose an enhancement.
15

Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, | 41. Moreover, there can be no double jeopardy
violation, because, "[w]ith respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial,
the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from
prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended/ 7 Missouri v. Hunter,
459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983).
Given this case law, Defendant cannot prevail on his double jeopardy and
merger challenges to the trial court's application of the dangerous weapons
enhancement statute.
B. The possession~by-a-restricted-person statute criminalizes the
use, as well as the possession, of dangerous weapons.
Defendant, a restricted person, violated the section by using, as
well as by possessing, a dangerous weapon, and was therefore
properly subject to enhancements for having used a dangerous
weapon in the commission of that felony.
Alternatively, Defendant claims that his possession-by-a-restricted-person
offense could not support dangerous weapons sentencing enhancements.
According to Defendant, the enhancement statute does not"permit an enhancement
for a weapon possession when the possession is the sole element of the underlying
crime/ 7 Br. Appellant at 18. Moreover, Defendant asserts, the enhancement statute
applies only "when a weapon is used in the commission or furtherance of a felony,77
and possession of a weapon by a restricted person does not constitute "use[] in the
commission or furtherance of a felony.77 Id. This argument misapprehends the
statutory elements of possession by a restricted person.
16

The enhancement was proper because Defendant's conviction was for use of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person.

Under statutory law, a "Category I

restricted person who intentionally or knowingly ... purchases, transfers, possesses,
uses, or has under his custody or control... any dangerous weapon other than a
firearm is guilty of a third degree felony/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(b).
Defendant was charged and convicted under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(b) as a
Category I restricted person for intentionally or knowingly purchasing, transferring,
possessing, using, or having a knife under his control. R7 (information). Thus, he
was charged not only with possessing, but also with using the knife.
Moreover, the evidence supporting Defendant's conviction on that charge
showed that Defendant not only possessed the knife, but that he also used it. Thus,
his conviction for possession by a restricted person was not merely a conviction for
possession of a dangerous weapon but for use of that weapon. Mere possession of
the knife as a restricted person might have sufficed to make the offense enhanceable
under the dangerous weapon possession statute. But his use of the knife as a
restricted person definitely did. Subsection 2 of the enhancement statute requires a
one-year increase of the minimum sentence and permits a five-year increase in the
maximum sentence "[i]f the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a
dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of a felony." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8(2). Defendant used his knife in commission of the felony of
17

possession or use by a restricted person when he stabbed McKissick. Thus, the
increased sentence for weapons possession by a restricted person was proper.
Finally, Defendant's use of the knife also supports his conviction and sentence
for recidivism. Subsection 4 of the enhancement statute requires that the trial court
impose an additional five-to-ten-year consecutive sentence "[i]f the trier of fact finds
beyond a reasonable doubt that a person has been sentenced to term of
imprisonment for a felony in which a dangerous weapon was used in the
commission of or furtherance of the felony and that person is subsequently
convicted of another felony in which a dangerous weapon was used in the
commission of the felony/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8(4).
The trial court, acting as trier-of-fact, found that Defendant had been
convicted and sentenced for a 1998 Nevada felony in which he used a dangerous
weapon. Rl94:111. As explained, the trial court also found that Defendant had
used a dangerous weapon in committing both the aggravated assault and the
possession-by-a-restricted-person offenses. See R194:112. Hence, the trial court
properly found Defendant subject to the enhancement for recidivism.
But the trial court imposed only one sentence under the subsection 4
enhancement provision. R195:4. And, while Defendant challenges imposition of the
subsection 4 enhancement on the basis of his possession-by-a-restricted-person
charge, he has not challenged the imposition of the enhancement on the basis of his
18

aggravated assault charge. Thus, an alternative unchallenged basis survives to
support imposition of this enhanced term, and this Court need not address
Defendant's claim that enhancement of his possession-by-a-restricted-person
offense under subsection 4 was improper. See State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801,810 (Utah
App. 1998) (when a defendant challenges only some of the bases for a trial court's
decision, the appellate court "need not address whether the trial court erred in
considering [them]," because the other bases survive to support the trial court's
decision).
In sum, the trial court committed no error in its application of the dangerous
weapons enhancements to Defendant's case. Thus, Defendant's claims challenging
that application fail.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN NOT SUA
SPONTE RULING THAT THE ADDITIONAL FIVE-TO-TENYEAR CONSECUTIVE TERM CONSTITUTED CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT UNDER ARTICLE 1, SECTION 9, OF
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
Defendant claims that the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte ruling
that his consecutive five-to-ten-year prison term constituted cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Utah constitution.

See Br. Appellant at 19-27.

Defendant cannot prevail on this claim because he has not demonstrated that error,
if any, should have been obvious.
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To establish plain error a defendant must show that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome/' State
v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, \ 26,128 P.2d 1179 (citation and internal quotation omitted). An
error is obvious only if "the law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged
error was made/ 7 State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63,116, 95 P.3d 276. "Utah courts have
repeatedly held that a trial court's error is not plain where there is no settled
appellate law to guide the trial court." State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App.
1997) (citing State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29,35-36 (Utah 1989); State v. Braun, 778 P.2d
1336,1341-42 (Utah App. 1990)).
Here, Defendant's plain error claim fails as a matter of law because he cannot
show obvious error. No possible error in imposing the additional five-to-ten-year
consecutive prison term could have been obvious to the trial court, because there is

20

no settled appellate law stating that such a term for that offense is unconstitutional
Defendant cites no such authority, and the State is aware of none.3
In sum, Defendant's plain error claim fails because Defendant has not shown
that error, if any, was obvious.

3

Defendant relies on language in the plurality opinion written by then-Justice
Durham in State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 631 (Utah 1997), to support his claim that the
dangerous weapon enhancement violates the Utah constitution. Gardner addressed
the constitutionality of a Utah statute that made assault by a prisoner a capital
offense in certain circumstances. See id. at 632. Gardner does not support
Defendant's claim. First, the majority reached no holding under the Utah
constitution. See id. at 653-58 (J. Zimmerman, concurring in part and concurring in
the result; JJ. Russon and Howe, dissenting). Only two justices adopted the portion
of the opinion addressing the Utah constitution. See id. at 653. The three-justice
majority agreed only that the statute violated the Eighth Amendment. See id.
Second, the issue in that case was the propriety of the death penalty, not the
propriety of any sentence for a certain number of years. See id. at 632.
Defendant cites no other authority for his claim. While he references several
United States Supreme Court cases — Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); and Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), those cases address the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, not article 1 of the Utah constitution. Moreover, those
cases, unlike the instant case, all involved sentences for death or for a term up to life,
not sentences for a term of years.
Defendant also cites several state cases — State v. Rivera, 2003 UT App 169U;
State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54 (Utah App. 1989); and State v. South, 932 P.2d 622
(Utah App. 1977). But none of these cases address the constitutionality of the
dangerous weapon enhancement statute or otherwise support Defendant's claim.
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III.
DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT
ARGUING THAT THE ADDITIONAL FIVE-TO-TEN-YEAR
CONSECUTIVE TERM CONSTITUTED CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT UNDER THE UNITED STATES AND
UTAH CONSTITUTIONS
Defendant also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not arguing
that the additional five-to-ten-year consecutive term for recidivism constituted cruel
and unusual punishment under the United States or Utah constitutions. See Br.
Appellant at 27-32. Defendant cannot prevail on this claim because he has not
shown that counsel's performance was deficient or prejudicial.
"An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal
presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ^ 6,89 P.3d 162. To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must demonstrate both that "counsel's
performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment/' and that "counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial—
i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,119,12
P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)).
In proving the first prong of Strickland—that counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness — Defendant must demonstrate "why,
on the basis of the law in effect at the time of trial, his or her trial counsel's
performance was deficient." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1228 (Utah 1993) (citations
omitted). Defendant may not predicate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
22

on a novel question of law. See Lilly v. Gilmore, 988 F.2d 783, 786 (7th Or. 1993)
('The Sixth Amendment does not require counsel to forecast changes or advances in
the law...."); cf. United States v. Cook 45 F.3d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1995) (Sixth
Amendment does not require appellate counsel to raise every nonfrivolous issue).
Here, as explained under Point II., above, there is no controlling appellate law
proscribing enhancement of Defendant's sentences under the dangerous weapons
enhancement statute. There is no controlling appellate law holding that the
enhancement, or any similar enhancement, constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the United States or Utah constitutions. Thus, counsel's not
arguing, on the basis of the law in effect at the time of trial, that the enhancement
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under either constitution was neither
deficient nor prejudicial.
Because Defendant has not shown that counsel's performance was deficient or
that he suffered any prejudice, he cannot prevail on his ineffective assistance claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
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Addendum

Addendum

United States Constitution, Amendments V and VIII
Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Amendment V I I I
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.

UTAH STATE LEGiSLATUREHome | Site f$ap | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Searcf

Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to
secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of
that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the
defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
No History for Constitution
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 00101 J)01200.Z1P 2,259 Bytes
Sections in this Chapter|Chapters in this Title|AII TitleslLegislative Home Page
Last revised: Thursday, May 28, 2009

UTAH STATE LEGISLATUREHome | Site Map | Calendar [ Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search

Article I, Section 9. [Excessive bail and fines - Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall
cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be
treated with unnecessary rigor.
No History for Constitution
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 00I01_000900.ZIP 1,579 Bytes
Sections in this Chapter|Chapters in this Title|AII Titles|Legislative Home Page
Last revised: Thursday, May 28, 2009
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 5. OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON
PART 1. ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES
§ 76-5-103, Aggravated assault
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another/

or

(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (1) (a) , uses a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to
produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection

(1)(a) is a second degree felony.

(3) A violation of Subsection

(1)(b) is a third degree felony.

Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-103/
Laws 1974, c. 32, § 10/
Laws 1995, c. 291, § 5, eff. May 1, 1995.
<General Materials

Laws 1989, c. 170, § 2/

(GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>

CROSS REFERENCES
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102.
Body armor, increase of sentence if worn in violent felony, see § 76-3- 203.7.
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq.
Enhanced penalty, certain offenses committed by prisoner, see § 76-3-203.6.
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301.
Force in defense of person, forcible felony defined, see § 76-2-402.
Habitual violent offenders, definition and penalties, see § "6-3-203.5.
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 7 6 - 4 - 3 0 2 .
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 10. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, WELFARE, AND MORALS
PART 5. WEAPONS
§ 7 6-10-503. Restrictions on possession, purchase, transfer, and ownership of
dangerous weapons by certain persons
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) A Category I restricted person is a person who:
(i) has been convicted of any violent felony as defined in Section 76-3- 203.5;
(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony;
(iii) is on parole from a secure facility as defined m

Section 62A-7-1Q1; or

(iv) within the last ten years has been adjudicated delinquent for an offense
which if committed by an adult would have been a violent felony as defined in
Section 76-3-203.5.
(b) A Category II restricted person is a person who:
(i) has been convicted of or is under indictment for any felony;
(ii) within the last seven years has been adjudicated delinquent for an offense
which if committed by an adult would have been a felony;
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in Secrion
2;

58-37-

(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is knowingly and intentionally
in unlawful possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance as defined in
Section 58-37-2;
(v) has been found not guilty by reason of insanity for a felony offense;
(vi) has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial for a felony offense;
(vii) has been adjudicated as mentally defective as provided in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993), [FN1]
or has been committed to a mental institution;

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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(viii) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
(ix) has been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces; or
(x) has renounced his citizenship after having been a citizen of the United
States .
(2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees, consents,
offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, possess, use, or have under his custody
or control, or who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, possesses,
uses, or has under his custody or control:
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third degree

felony.

(3) A Category II restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or
has under his custody or control:
(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(4) A person may be subject to the restrictions of both categories at the same
time.
(5) If a higher penalty than is prescribed in this section is provided in another
section for one who purchases, transfers, possesses,
uses, or has under this custody or control any dangerous weapon, the penalties of that section control.
(6) It is an affirmative defense to a charge based on the definition in Subsection
(1)(b)(iv) that the person was:
(a) in possession of a controlled substance pursuant to a lawful order of a practitioner for use of a member of the person's household or for administration to an
animal owned by the person or a member of the person's household; or
(b) otherwise authorized by law to possess the substance.
Laws 2000, c. 303, § 5, eff. May 1, 2000;
Laws 2003, c. 203, § 2, eff. May 5, 2003;
2003.
[FN1]

Laws 2000, c. 90, § 1, eff. May 1, 2000;
Laws 2003, c. 235, § 1, eff. May 5,

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 921 et seq.
<General Materials

(GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 3. PUNISHMENTS
PART 2. SENTENCING
§ 76-3-203.8. Increase of sentence if dangerous weapon used
(1) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as in
Section 76-1-601.
(2) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous weapon
was used in the commission or furtherance of a felony, the court:
(a)(i) shall increase by one year the minimum term of the sentence applicable by
law; and
(ii) if the minimum term applicable by law is zero, shall set the minimum term
as one year; and
(b) may increase by five years the maximum sentence applicable by law in the case
of a felony of the second or third degree.
(3) A defendant who is a party to a felony offense shall be sentenced
to the increases in punishment provided in Subsection (2) if the trier of fact finds beyond
a reasonable doubt that:
(a) a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony;
and
(b) the defendant knew that the dangerous weapon was present.
(4) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a person has been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony in which a dangerous weapon was
used in the commission of or furtherance of the felony and that person is subsequently convicted of another felony in which a dangerous weapon was used in the
commission of or furtherance of the felony, the court shall, m addition to any
other sentence imposed including those in Subsection (2), impose an indeterminate
prison term to be not less than five nor more than ten years to run consecutively
and not concurrently.
Laws 2003, c. 148, § 4, eff. May 5, 2003;
2004.

Laws 2004, c. 276, § 2, eff. May 3,

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
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